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THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

MORE FEMALE EMPLOYEES, MORE PROVISIONS?

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MORE FEMALE EMPLOYEES, MORE PROVISIONS?

ABSTRACT

No one will question that the share of women working in the Dutch labour market increased over the last decades. It is also apparent that there is a rapid development of childcare and other work-family balance provisions in collective labour agreements (CLAs): either these provisions are being included in collective agreements, or existing provisions are being expanded. The reasons for this are obvious: from the employee's point of view, childcare provisions make it interesting for women to join or stay in the labour market; from the employer's point of view, although it may be a costly issue, these provisions may help attract and retain female employees.

The main question is the following: to what extent can the share of female employees covered by a CLA explain the presence of work-family provisions in CLAs? Furthermore, does the gender of the union negotiator have a significant additional effect?

The DUCADAM dataset, a digital database on collective labour agreements in the Netherlands, is used to tackle these questions. The findings show that the hypothesised relationships do not exist. Apparently, the supply of work-family provisions in CLAs is not a response to female employees' demands, nor is it affected by the negotiator's gender. Rather, economical factors seem to underlie work-family developments in CLAs, as indicated by the positive correlation between work-family provisions and yearly wage increase levels.

NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING

Het lijkt geen twijfel dat het percentage vrouwen op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt de afgelopen jaren is toegenomen. Het is ook bekend dat steeds meer kinderopvang- en andere werk-zorgregelingen in collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten (CAO's) worden opgenomen. De redenen hiervoor liggen voor de hand. Uit het oogpunt van de werknemer bezien maken kinderopvangregelingen het interessant voor de vrouwelijke werknemer om te gaan of blijven werken; uit het oogpunt van de werkgever bezien kunnen deze regelingen, hoewel kostbaar, helpen om vrouwelijke werknemers aan te trekken en te behouden.

De kernvraag is: in hoeverre kan de aanwezigheid van werk-zorgregelingen in CAO's verklaard worden door het aandeel vrouwen dat onder de CAO valt? Is verder het geslacht van de CAO-onderhandelaar van significant belang?

Deze vragen worden beantwoord met behulp van de DUCADAM dataset, een digitale CAO-databank waarin Nederlandse CAO's zijn opgeslagen. De resultaten van het onderzoek laten zien dat de veronderstelde verbanden niet bestaan. Blijkbaar zijn de werk-zorgontwikkelingen in CAO's niet het antwoord op de vraag daarnaar door vrouwelijke werknemers, noch op het geslacht van de CAO-onderhandelaar. De verklaring lijkt gezocht te moeten worden in economische motieven, gezien de positieve samenhang tussen werk-zorgregelingen in de CAO en jaarlijkse structurele loonsverhoging.

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I INTRODUCTION

Most countries in the European Union witnessed rising female employment rates over the last decades, as well as an increasing awareness of the importance of a favourable work-family balance. In the Netherlands, the situation is no different. In this paper, the relationship between the two issues is analysed. It starts with a description of the current state of affairs in the Netherlands, and is followed by hypothesis formulation, a description of the data and the methodology, and results and conclusions.

1.1 DUTCH LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS AND THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE

Over a decade ago, the scientific council for government policy in the Netherlands (the WRR) set three main targets with respect to the Dutch labour market (WRR 1991; De Beer 2002). First, to counter the effects of an aging population and stimulate economic growth; second, to stimulate emancipation and equality processes, and third, to promote individual well-being and happiness. In practice, this should be achieved by increasing the labour force, giving women more opportunities to enter the labour market, and helping women and men find a good work-family balance, respectively. Today, work-family balance is an important issue in many countries in the European Union (Department for Education and Employment 1998; Bruegel 1999; Schulten 2000; Yeandle e.a. 2000; EIRO 2001; OECD 2001; EuroFound 2004). With employment rates of both men and women rising steadily, the need for effective arrangements that facilitate the combination of work and care is growing. While 'care' can signify both care for children, care for other family members living in the same house, and care for family living elsewhere, the usual interpretation is the first. Therefore, in this paper care will be defined as childcare. Ermisch (2003) asserts that in richer countries, marriage and childbearing now occur much later in people's lives, and they are having fewer children. Couples may decide to postpone having children, in favour of being employed (OECD 2001). Consequently, many new government policies and laws are dealing with this issue. Examining transitions on the Dutch labour market, the situation is no different. The employment rate has risen considerably, which is mostly due to the participation of women. Between 1993 and 2003, the employment rate increased from 57 per cent to 65 per cent (CBS 2004); for women it grew from 42 per cent to 54 per cent¹. Considering that women may be mothers of young children, the demand for arrangements that help workers find a beneficial work-family balance became stronger. This concern was recognised by the Ministry of Social Affairs, who launched a plan of action in July 2001, intending to stimulate labour market participation of women (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2001). The plan included lowering the income threshold for mothers claiming childcare taxes deduction.

¹ Employment rate is defined as the number of working people aged 15 to 64, divided by the total population aged 15 to 64.

Work-family arrangements can be both informal and formal. Informal arrangements include childminding by grandparents and other family members, neighbours, or unpaid babysitters. They are the primary choice of lower-educated (and therefore mostly low-income) families (Esveldt 2002), possibly because informal childcare arrangements are relatively cheap. In 2000, 84 per cent of Dutch women who had children aged between 0 and 4 made use of informal childcare arrangements (Leijnse 2001).

Formal arrangements are found in Dutch law, for instance the Part-time Labour Act (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur (WAA), established in July 2000), and the Work and Care Act (Wet arbeid & zorg (Wa&z), December 2001). The WAA states that every employee has the right to ask his or her employer to work fewer or more hours per week. The employer must comply with this request, providing the company's interests are not harmed. The Wa&z envelops several regulations that deal with childcare. According to this legislation, women are allowed at least 16 weeks of fully paid pregnancy and maternity leave, of which 10 weeks must occur after giving birth. The father can also take leave to be present at childbirth and on two days afterwards. In addition to this, both parents are entitled to unpaid parental leave, for the duration of 13 times their weekly working hours. Someone working 36 hours a week, for example, is entitled to 468 hours of unpaid leave, which amounts to 13 weeks. In the regulation, it is advised that the parent works 50 per cent of their usual working hours, spread out over half a year (Ministry of Social Affairs en Employment 2004). In the example, the employee would then be working 18 hours a week for 26 weeks. Formal work-family arrangements are appreciated widely in the Netherlands; Dutch couples expect it to be easier to combine work and family in the future, given the increasing opportunities for childcare, working at home, flex-work, part-time work and care leave (Ester and Vinken 2000).

One of the most important institutions that cover formal childcare arrangements in the Netherlands is the collective labour agreement (CLA). CLAs are collective agreements on conditions of employment between employees, who are represented by trade unions, and employers, who are sometimes represented by employers' organisations. The importance lies in the fact that, for instance, CLAs are not always bound by law – in many articles of law, stipulations are recorded that a CLA may deviate, partly or entirely, from that specific article. All articles of law that deal with the work-family balance have these kinds of additional declarations. There are two types of CLAs: company CLAs, which pertain to one company, and sectoral CLAs, which pertain to an entire branch of industry. 14 per cent of all Dutch employees are covered by a company CLA, and sectoral CLAs cover 70 per cent of Dutch employees. *Regular agreements* concern conditions and benefits like wages, work schedules, rights and obligations, working conditions, social security, and work-family themes. *Non-regular agreements* cover only one subject of regular CLAs, like social funds, training, and older workers, known in Dutch as SF, O&O, and VUT, respectively. These types of agreements usually exist alongside a regular CLA of the company or sector, and they are used when a specific

target population must be addressed. This target population is generally smaller than the number of employees covered by the regular CLA, which may have consequences for the agreement becoming generally binding².

Although the sectoral level of collective bargaining remains dominant in the Netherlands, a trend towards decentralisation can be observed over the years until about the year 2000, as ever more (decentralised) company-level labour agreements were being negotiated. One of the consequences has been a rising demand for people who can represent employees in collective bargaining. In accordance with increasing female employment rates, the number of female trade union negotiators grew also. For instance, in 1996, 39 female negotiators were employed by FNV trade unions in the Netherlands, while in 2000 there were 60. From then on, however, this number began decreasing again. Now, approximately 50 women (and 100 men³) are responsible for collective bargaining by FNV.

In this paper, the following question will be addressed: can the presence of work-family provisions in CLAs be explained by the share of female employees covered by the CLA and by the gender of the CLA's main trade union negotiator? In the next section, ideas and theories that relate to this question are described.

1.2 THEORIES AND IDEAS ABOUT THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE

The rising female employment rate is not unique to the Netherlands. In all countries belonging to the European Union – except Sweden, where the rate was already very high – the employment rate of women increased over the past decade, ranging from 2 percentage points in Denmark to over 18 percentage points in Ireland (Eurostat 2003). It is informative to see whether balancing work and family life is an important issue in these other countries. What measures have the government, employers, trade unions or individual people taken to arrange the care of children when parents are at work? Most countries in the European Union have parental leave arrangements that allow one or both parents time off to care for their children, either paid or unpaid. Employees in Denmark can count on 13 to 26 weeks of paid parental leave. The level of pay is at most 70 per cent of unemployment benefits. The employer can get this payment refunded by the government. Compared with most other European countries, childcare provision has been widely available in Finland for some decades. For every child, a place in a day-care centre is reserved until they are seven years old. Recent legislation allows firms to arrange childcare services for those employees who would otherwise stay at home to look after a sick child (www.eurofound.eu.int 2004). Mothers are also allowed up to

² A CLA that is declared generally binding is valid and binding for all employers in the same branch of industry. Employers can ask for this declaration at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment if they want to limit unfair competition by other employers in the same branch with respect to terms and conditions. The request is granted if the CLA covers at least 55 per cent of all employees in the branch, or if it covers at least 52 per cent and is considered important because of, for instance, its representative character.

³ The development of men working as a negotiator at FNV has followed almost exactly the same pattern as that of female negotiators.

three years of unpaid leave after childbirth, after which their old job will still be available to them. In Luxembourg, female employees can choose to prolong their maternity leave, after which the employer is obligated to rehire the woman if a job is available. The situation in France is almost identical to that in Luxembourg, except that men can make use of this option too. Portuguese law grants employees the right to interrupt their work for the duration of 6 months, during which they receive no benefits, to care for children of their own, of their spouse's or an adopted child. This period is extendable to 2 years. However, this option is only available for either the father or the mother (www.eurofound.eu.int 2004).

In July 2000, the German parliament (Bundestag) adopted a revision of the Federal Childcare Payment and Parental Leave Act (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz), which contains new provisions on parental leave and childcare payments (EIRO 2001). The new act came into force on 1 January 2001. The most important changes made to parental leave are that both parents are allowed to take parental leave at the same time, and the permitted maximum level of part-time work during parental leave is extended from 19 to 30 hours per week. Furthermore, parents have the right to work part-time for between 15 and 30 hours per week. Employers are permitted to reject such requests only if this creates considerable problems for the company. After the period of parental leave, the employees concerned have the right to return to full-time work. In addition, parents have the opportunity to postpone the third year of parental leave until the eighth birthday of the child (Schulten 2000). Finally, the upper limits of net annual income, below which parents are entitled to a full childcare benefit payment, increased by about 10 per cent.

The situation is somewhat different in the UK. Until recently, public provision of childcare has been very limited, because the British government regarded care of children as the private responsibility of parents throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, informal childcare arrangements have dominated, with grandparental and paternal care cited as the most commonly used sources of childcare by employed mothers of pre-school children (Gardiner cited in Bruegel 1999). Because professional childcare is expensive, mainly dual or high-wage earners make use of it. This type of childcare may be provided in a variety of settings: in the child's own home, by nannies or au pairs; in the childcare worker's home, for example by registered childminders; or in day nurseries, out-of-school facilities and activity clubs led by nurses, play leaders, play workers and childcare assistants (Yeandle e.a. 2000). Only in the late 1990s has there been a large increase in the number of day nurseries in England, and this upward trend seems likely to continue. The most important reason for this increase is the introduction of the National Childcare Strategy in 1998, which is expected to create 90.000 new childcare jobs. Furthermore, it offers help with childcare costs for an estimated 1.5 million lower earning families, and it places more emphasis on out-of-school provision (Department for Education and Employment 1998).

The OECD has recently investigated policies and practices related to balancing work and family life and relevant flexible work arrangements for the United States, Canada, Japan and all EU countries except Luxembourg (OECD 2001). These countries are rated according to the extent to which work-family provisions are available to working parents. This score is a composition of the coverage of the under-three-year-olds in formal childcare, maternity leave, flexi-time, voluntary part-time and the extra-statutory leave by firms. The scores are standardised with an average of zero; a positive score means that work-family provisions are better than average. It turns out that there is a strong correlation between this work-family provision score and the female employment rate ($r=0.81$); much stronger than the correlation with the male employment rate ($r=0.52$).

In their 2003 report of the ongoing research project on childcare arrangements in CLAs, the Dutch Labour Inspectorate found that, in a representative sample of 125 Dutch CLAs, 89 per cent includes a childcare provision (Schaeps 2003). In 1990, this was only 21 per cent. After considering CLA coverage, they concluded that 68 per cent of the Dutch working population could now make use of such an arrangement.

It is clear that female labour market participation rates steadily increased in all EU countries during the last decade, and work-family issues like childcare received more and more government and media attention. It seems likely that the growing share of women in the labour force created an increasing demand for work-family arrangements, which are being supplied through the institution of the collective labour agreement. Female trade union negotiators possibly helped speed up this process. The empirical evidence for this, as described in the preceding paragraphs, is measured at country level. In order to understand the assumed relationship between female employment and trade union negotiators on the one hand, and work-family provisions in CLAs on the other, the level of analysis in this paper is the collective labour agreement.

In principle, collective agreements can contain nine types of work-family provisions: (1) opportunities for part-time work; (2) childcare facilities or provisions; (3) paternity leave arrangements; (4) parental leave arrangements; (5) maternity leave arrangements; (6) opportunities for employees to work flexible hours; (7) teleworking or working at home arrangements; (8) career break opportunities; and (9) financial compensation for services like cleaning, gardening, ironing and grocery service. Of these, only the first five are covered formally in Dutch collective labour agreements. How do these provisions take shape in collective labour agreements, and how can they facilitate the combination of work and care? CLA regulations on part-time work are primarily centred on the question whether or not it is allowed. If so, the most important specifications that may be added are whether all employees can make use of it, whether a minimum number of working hours is required, and whether part-timers have the same rights as full-time employees. Working part-time enables parents to spend more time at home to care for their children. If, for example, an employee is scheduled to work five days a week from 10 AM until 4 PM, she can use the extra free time to bring children to

and from school. If children are not yet school age, a part-time construction where the employee works eight-hour days, but only three or four days a week, might be preferred. Parents can effectively save on expenses for kindergartens and babysitters, especially if the employee's partner has a similar arrangement. Childcare regulations typically include monetary contributions to employees with childcare needs. These regulations may vary from CLA to CLA with respect to the amount of financial compensation, the target population that is entitled to it, the maximum age of children for whom employees may use the compensation, and whether a special fund has been established in which money is reserved for the purpose of childcare compensation. Paternity, parental and maternity leave arrangements in CLAs are mostly concerned with the amount of time off that employees are entitled to, and whether they receive full pay during this time. Again, these leave arrangements allow parents to stay at home to carry out their childcare duties.

The first five hypotheses pertain to the relationship between female employment and work-family provisions in CLAs. More specifically, a positive relationship between the share of women who fall under CLA X and the presence of each of the five work-family items in CLA X is expected. One could argue that it would be more sensible to study parents⁴ instead of only women, since fathers also profit from work-family provisions in their collective labour agreement. However, there are two reasons to choose women instead of parents as the focus of this research. First, in 95 per cent of the households in which both partners have a job, the burden of combining work with childcare is carried by the woman (Tijdens, Dragstra and Dragstra e.a. 2002), so provisions in CLAs that facilitate this combination are more beneficial to women than to men. Secondly, labour market data on parents, particularly related to being covered by a CLA, do not exist on the scale that is needed for this research project.

Hypotheses 1a to 1e are formulated below.

- 1a) The likelihood of part-time regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger.
- 1b) The likelihood of childcare regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger.
- 1c) The likelihood of paternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger.
- 1d) The likelihood of parental leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger.
- 1e) The likelihood of pregnancy and maternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger.

⁴ Especially young parents, for example aged 20 to 35, for whom childcare may be an issue.

These hypotheses will be tested against the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between the share of women and the presence of a work-family provision.

Collective labour agreements are the result of collective bargaining between employers and trade union negotiators. A negotiator can be either male or female, which may influence their position towards work-family provisions as secondary benefits. These provisions are primarily beneficial to female employees, since women still carry most of the childcare burden. Being of the same gender, female negotiators understand this better than their male colleagues, and will therefore put more energy into bargaining for arrangements that will lighten the burden. This leads to the second set of five hypotheses, in which each of the five work-family items is hypothetically related to the gender of the main trade union negotiator – more specifically, in which being a female negotiator, as opposed to being a male one, increases the likelihood for a work-family item to be included in the CLA.

- 2a) The likelihood of part-time regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main trade union negotiator is a woman.
- 2b) The likelihood of childcare regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main trade union negotiator is a woman.
- 2c) The likelihood of paternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main trade union negotiator is a woman.
- 2d) The likelihood of parental leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main trade union negotiator is a woman.
- 2e) The likelihood of pregnancy and maternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main trade union negotiator is a woman.

These hypotheses will be tested against the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between the gender of the negotiator and the presence of each of the work-family provisions.

From an employer's point of view, paying for childcare and other work-family provisions can indeed be a useful instrument to attract and retain female employees, providing that the costs associated with it are reasonable. Initial investments in childcare provisions may be costly only if an employer finances childcare facilities within the company, so in practice, most companies outsource childcare to external day-care centres. If the share of women in the company or sector is low, then costs per FTE are limited, since a small number of women will make use of these arrangements. When the share of women in the company or sector is high, however, chances are that many women will make use of childcare provisions and employers may face an expensive employee benefit item. Thus, if relatively many women are employed within a company or a labour market branch, it is more costly for employers to provide female employees with work-family arrangements.


On the assumption that the five work-family provisions are interchangeable, an aggregate work-family provision variable can be constructed by combining these five provisions statistically to create a compound variable, measuring the level – or, to be more precise, the number – of work-family

provisions in a collective labour agreement. One of the advantages of such a compound variable is the increased variability: six possible values instead of only two. Providing that the construction of this variable is acceptable, the model will gain more accurate predicting power. Replacing the five dependent variables in hypotheses 1 and 2 with the aggregate variable yields the following hypotheses.

- 3) The number of work-family provisions included in a CLA is higher if the share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger.
- 4) The number of work-family provisions included in a CLA is higher if the main trade union negotiator is a woman.

These will be tested against the null-hypotheses that neither the share of female employees nor the gender of the trade union negotiator has an effect on the number of work-family provisions in the CLA. All hypotheses can be summarised graphically, as illustrated in the model in figure 1.

Figure 1. Research model with independent and dependent variables.



The independent variables, in the left part of the model, are hypothetically related to each distinct work-family provision (1) and to all provisions as a whole (2).

The basic relationship structure, as depicted above, will probably be more complex than this. A more realistic picture will include intervening and control variables. Consider wage increase, for instance. Collective agreements in which a generous wage increase has been agreed upon may leave the employer with fewer economic resources for the inclusion of work-family balance provisions than CLAs in which the wage increase is small or even non-existent. Thus, the level of wage increase may influence the relationship between the share of female employees and / or the gender of the negotiator on the one hand, and the presence or extent of work-family balance provisions on the other hand. If one assumes that larger companies tend to have larger budgets for things like child-

care and leave arrangements, then CLA size is another complicating factor in the proposed research model. Continuing on this thought, it would then make sense that sectoral CLAs have more work-family provisions than company CLAs, since they cover more employees. So, CLA type appears to play a part in the conceptual framework too. Finally, the public sector / private sector divide may be of importance, although exact implications cannot be estimated beforehand. The control variables that are mentioned here will be discussed in more detail in the next section on methods and measurements.

2 METHODS AND MEASUREMENTS

In this section, the dataset is described first, after which the operationalisation of variables and testing methods are explained.

2.1 CLAs IN THE NETHERLANDS

In the Netherlands, 80 per cent of all employees are covered by a collective labour agreement (Vossen and Engelen 2002). The exact number of CLAs depends on how they are defined. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment regards only those CLAs that have been registered at the ministry as valid⁵, which include both regular and non-regular agreements. In December 2003, the total number of current CLAs according to the ministry was 1005. The largest Dutch trade union confederation, the FNV, only considers regular collective labour agreements to be 'real' CLAs, of which more than 15 per cent are not registered at the ministry. The FNV is currently bargaining over 769 different CLAs, of which they keep a detailed account in a CLA database. The database contains about 92 per cent of all existing Dutch CLAs, which implies that there are now 836 collective labour agreements in force in the Netherlands. In the next paragraph, the backgrounds of the FNV's database are described, along with a general idea of the database itself.

Currently, 14 trade unions are affiliated with the FNV, FNV Bondgenoten being the largest with over 480.000 members. This trade union began setting up a database of all collective agreements signed by FNV-affiliated trade unions in the mid-90s (Tijdens 2002). The 'FNV cao-databank', as it is called, is a digital database which stores all collective labour agreements negotiated by FNV trade unions in the Netherlands since 1995. These CLAs are stored in the form of texts and 650 different coded characteristics, plus proposal letters, pamphlets, change notes and jurisprudence texts. In 2003, the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) has made both a scientific translation and an extension of the FNV database, culminating in the DUCADAM dataset⁶. This dataset is an SPSS file in which collective labour agreements are cases and CLA characteristics are variables. The extension consists of newly created meta-variables, which are not actually included in CLAs but are closely tied to them, for instance branch of industry, gender of the negotiator, and type of CLA (Schreuder and Tijdens 2003). This kind of collective labour agreement database is rather unique; a comparable database of the same scope and depth is constructed and updated by research and training organisation ACIRRT, of the University of Sydney, Australia, but nowhere else.


⁵ In order for a CLA to be lawfully valid, registration of the CLA by one or all of the negotiating parties at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is required.

⁶ DUCADAM is an acronym for Dutch Collective Agreements Database And Monitor.

In January 2004, the DUCADAM dataset contained 3752 CLAs, with 1001 different CLA-numbers⁷. Of these 1001, 769 CLAs are currently in force, while the other 232 ceased to exist because of mergers, takeovers, bankruptcies, or a decision not to prolong the collective agreement.

The research sample consists of the 769 current collective labour agreements, ‘current’ meaning that the starting dates of these CLAs lie in or after 2001; more than half of them have starting dates in 2003. In figure 1, they are categorised by branch of industry, which, for convenience’s sake, shows only the aggregate level branches; in the analysis, more detailed branch categories are used.

Figure 2. CLAs in the sample, categorised by aggregate level branch of industry. N = 769.



Almost half of all CLAs are found in manufacturing, while less than one seventh of the employed labour force is active in this branch of industry. This can partly be explained by the fact that, while a large firm is more likely to have a collective labour agreement than a smaller company, more large-sized companies can be found in manufacturing than in any other branch of industry. A more important reason is of a historic nature, however. In the early days of collective bargaining, the majority of the working population had a job in either manufacturing or farming; in other words, these branches of industry have a long history during which many collective labour agreements came into being. Usually, employers’ and employees’ representatives agree on sectoral CLAs first, after which mainly large companies begin formulating their own collective agreements. This is especially true for CLAs in manufacturing – to a large extent, farmers have never been organised, but factory workers have. Furthermore, manufacturing workers were proud of their craft. In order to protect their individual interests they tended to be organised in guilds and other associations, unlike employees in other branches. This put representatives of the guilds in a good position to bargain with the employer

⁷ The difference between 3752 and 1001 can be understood by realising that a CLA number is present in the database 3,75 times on average, but the starting and expiration dates are different. For example, the CLA of Dutch Public Univer-

over terms and conditions of employment. However, this last argument is not very strong, given the large time gap between the era of guilds and the early days of collective labour agreements. Although the share of jobs in manufacturing decreased over time in relation to other branches, while workers' representation developed and grew outside of manufacturing, the large number of CLAs in the manufacturing industry remained.

In the next section, the work-family items in collective labour agreements are outlined and operationalised, after which the independent variables are described similarly.

2.2 VARIABLES OF THE MODEL

In the DUCADAM dataset, each collective labour agreement is coded for the presence or absence of regulations regarding part-time work, childcare, paternity leave, parental leave and pregnancy and maternity leave. These are the dependent variables of hypotheses 1 and 2. When an item is present, the variable is given the score of 1, and absence of the item results in a score of 0. The dependent compound variable in hypotheses 3 and 4 is called the 'work-family balance score' and is operationalised as the number of work-family balance provisions in CLAs. Scores can range from 0 to 5, where 0 means that the CLA contains no work-family arrangements, and a score of 5 means that all items, (1) through (5), are present in the CLA. A more precise score for the extent of work-family provisions in CLAs may be computed by also incorporating a number of specification variables (see section 3.3), but for now, only the incidence of the provisions is used to compute the score.

Before moving on to the description of the independent variables, some clarification on the Dutch system of categorising businesses may be useful. Each business, firm or company can be classified according to its core activity. The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) defined a system called the Standard Business Index (SBI), which, at the highest level, consists of 17 branches of industry, labelled A to Q. Each branch is divided into one or more sub-branches of industry. There are 58 sub-branches, numbered (discontinuously) from 01 to 99. This process of division continues until, at the most detailed level, a business is characterised by a five-digit code. A firm that is categorised under code 6021.1 (Regulated public transport of persons by road) automatically falls under the categories 6021 (Regulated transport of persons by road), 602 (Transport by road), 60 (Transport over land) and I (Transport, storage and communication).

The independent variable 'female employment share', in hypotheses 1 and 3, is operationalised as the number of women working within a sub-branch of industry⁸, divided by the total number of

sities, which has CLA-number 1108, is present in the database four times – one that has been valid from 1-1-1999 till 31-5-2000, one from 1-6-2000 till 31-5-2002, one from 1-6-2002 till 31-8-2003, and one from 31-8-2003 onwards.

⁸ Ideally, since the level of analysis is the collective labour agreement, the female employment share should be measured at that level as well. In other words, the exact share of female employees should be known for each CLA. However, since these data are not available, aggregated data will be used. This means that each CLA is assigned the value for the share of female employees in the branch of industry in which the CLA belongs, and not the value for the share of female employees covered by the CLA itself. The female employment share is based on employees who work at least twelve hours per week, since the CBS considers working fewer hours non-substantial.

workers within the sub-branch. These data are obtained from the CBS. After assigning one of the sub-branch codes to each collective labour agreement, the female employment share that corresponds to that sub-branch is attributed to the CLA.

The gender of CLA negotiators, used in hypotheses 2 and 4, is measured at CLA level. A female negotiator is coded zero and a one represents a male negotiator.

Because the dependent variable in hypotheses 1a through 1e is of the Yes/No type, these hypotheses are tested using logistic regression, linking female employment shares to the presence of work-family provisions in CLAs. Hypotheses 2a through 2e are also tested by means of logistic regression, relating gender to work-family arrangements in CLAs. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested with linear regression models, since the dependent compound variable 'work-family provision score' is measured at interval scale instead of nominal.

Next, the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables will be specified by including four control variables. These variables are the yearly wage increase, CLA size, sector type, and CLA type. It is plausible that in CLAs where the employer and trade union have agreed on generous work-family arrangements, that this was accomplished at the cost of structural wage increases⁹. This would imply lower annual wage increases in CLAs with a higher work-family balance score. In other words, wage increase has a moderating effect on the relationship. In the DUCADAM dataset, up to eight variables are reserved for structural wage increase percentages, each accompanied by a date at which the increase takes place. For example, in the potato, vegetable and fruit wholesale CLA that is valid from 01-01-2003 to 30-06-2004, a structural wage increase takes place on three separate dates: 1 per cent on 01-01-2003, 1.5 per cent on 01-07-2003 and again 1.5 per cent on 01-01-2004. The annual wage increase percentage can be computed by adding the percentages consecutively¹⁰, and dividing this by the duration of the collective agreement. In this example, the annual wage increase percentage would be 4.05 per cent.

Large companies and branches of industry tend to be especially innovative with regard to employee terms and conditions. This is called trend setting behaviour – after observing how large firms introduce work-family provisions into their CLA, other, smaller companies may follow this example. Firm or branch size can thus be a control variable that partly obscures the relationship between the share of female employees and the presence of work-family items in CLAs. The data on CLA size, or the number of employees that a CLA refers to in the DUCADAM dataset come from both the FNV trade union and the Labour Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. They are available for 80 per cent of the CLAs in the sample.

Although their effect cannot be accurately identified beforehand, the last two control variables are still deemed important in relation to this subject. The first is a dichotomous variable 'sector'. Com-

⁹ Structural wage increase as opposed to incidental wage increase. Wages increased structurally cannot be made undone by the employer; furthermore, this increase affects pension levels, whereas incidental wage increases do not.

¹⁰ According to the formula $(1 + p_1/100) * (1 + p_2/100) * (1 + p_3/100) * \dots - 1$, where p is the percentage.

panies and branches of industry can be categorised into either the public or the private sector. Public sector or governmental companies can be considered to play an exemplary role with respect to industrial relations, which might positively affect the presence of work-family provisions in public sector CLAs. On the other hand, competition in the private or market sector is fiercer, which may move employers to introduce or improve work-family provisions in their CLA in order to attract and retain employees. A similar rationale can be upheld for the second control variable, CLA type. As mentioned before, CLAs can be categorised into two types: company CLAs and sectoral CLAs. Competition on terms and conditions is stronger between firms that are bound by a company CLA than between those that are bound by a sectoral CLA – in the latter case, there is hardly any competition, since all firms must adhere to the same sectoral CLA. This illustrates the importance of checking whether these variables have an effect on the relationship between the share of female employees and the presence of work-family items in CLAs. The correlation between these control variables and the independent variables of the model is sufficiently small to include them safely in the analysis¹¹.

¹¹ See appendix 2 for the correlation coefficients.

3 RESULTS

This part of the paper is introduced by a descriptive account of how and to what extent collective labour agreements in the Netherlands facilitate the combination of work and family. In other words, how are the dependent and independent variables of this paper distributed? After this, the main results of the paper are displayed, which will be followed by a section in which the dependent variable is scrutinised.

3.1 THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE IN DUTCH CLAs

In 59 per cent of collective agreements, a provision for part-time work is included, while in 60 per cent of CLAs in the Netherlands childcare arrangements are included, as can be seen in the 'Mean' column in table 1. Paternity leave arrangements that are more generous in comparison to regulations in the law¹² are found in 20 per cent of Dutch CLAs, and parental leave is covered in almost 12 per cent of the CLAs in the sample. Lastly, pregnancy and maternity leave exceeding legal regulations are contained in only 8 per cent of the CLAs. In table 2, the work-family provision variables are detailed further.

Table 1. Descriptives for the dependent and independent variables. N = 769.

Variable	N	Min	Max	Mean	sd
<u>Dependent variables</u>					
Part-time provisions	769	0	1	0.59	0.49
Childcare provisions	769	0	1	0.60	0.49
Paternity leave provisions	769	0	1	0.20	0.40
Parental leave provisions	769	0	1	0.12	0.32
Pregnancy and maternity leave provisions	768	0	1	0.08	0.27
Work-family balance score	769	0	5	1.59	1.16
<u>Independent variables</u>					
Female employment rate (%)	753	3.8	79.1	30.8	16.0
Negotiator's gender (0 or 1)	768	0	1	0.72	0.45

Sources: CBS 2004 and DUCADAM dataset 2004.

Combining the five provisions to arrive at the work-family balance score, it turns out that, on average, collective labour agreements include between one and two work-family provisions. In more than 20 per cent of CLAs, no work-family provisions can be found at all, while in less than 5 per cent more than three different provisions are included.

¹² 'Generous' with respect to the employee: in other words, the employee is better off under the CLA than under the law.

There are large differences between branches of industry with respect to the share of female employees. Relatively few women (less than 10 per cent of all employees in the branch) are found working in the metal industry, construction, automobile and transport industry and shipping. Typical female branches are health, clothing industry, and other services (more than 75 per cent women). On average, 30.8 per cent of the labour force that is covered by a CLA is female, which is somewhat lower than the share of female employees in the labour force as a whole (41.8 per cent). Considering that 85 per cent of the labour force is covered by a CLA, this seems to indicate that of the remaining 15 per cent, a little over 100 per cent of the employees is female. However, the average of 30.8 per cent is based on data measured at the sub-branch of industry level, not on an individual level. The main explanation for this relatively low percentage is the vast number of collective labour agreements in the manufacturing industry, where the share of female employees is low.

In 72 per cent of the collective labour agreements, a male negotiator is responsible for the trade union side of the collective bargaining, which means that women bargained over the remaining 28 per cent. In table 3, further details are provided about the negotiators.

Table 2. Number of collective labour agreements that contain work-family balance provisions, and number of employees, working 12 hours or more per week, who can make use of these provisions through the CLA. The data are categorised by branch of industry. N = 769.

Branch of industry	CLA coverage	# CLAs	Work-family balance provisions				
			Part-time work provisions	Childcare provisions	Paternity leave arrangements	Parental leave arrangements	Pregnancy / maternity leave provisions
Agriculture and fishing	77%	11	5	4	1	2	0
Minerals	18.1%	3	1	0	0	0	0
Manufacturing industry	76.3%	346	252	246	90	35	28
Energy	23.3%	8	3	4	2	4	3
Construction	73%	14	9	12	3	2	1
Trading	68.6%	76	43	56	20	6	4
Catering	24.6%	4	3	4	0	0	1
Transportation	86.2%	125	43	33	5	10	9
Financial services	82.5%	27	13	16	4	6	3
Business services	50.9%	60	35	37	13	6	3
Public administration	0.7%	8	4	4	0	2	0
Education	65%	13	8	6	6	3	2
Health	79.2%	20	11	13	4	4	1
Other services	41.8%	54	22	28	6	10	7
Total	63.1%	769	452	463	154	90	62
Employees affected (x 1000)		4743	3575	3687	985	1190	875

Source: DUCADAM dataset. The number '4' in the top row means that four of the eleven CLAs in the agriculture and fishing branch include childcare provisions. CLA coverage is the number of employees covered by a CLA in a particular branch of industry, in relation to all employees in that branch of industry. Note that the numbers in the bottom row, relating to employees affected, are in reality somewhat higher. They are computed using data in the DUCADAM dataset, which has missing values for 154 of the 769 cases.

In table 2, frequencies for the five work-family provisions in CLAs are differentiated by branch of industry. In the minerals and transportation branch, the work-family conditions in CLAs are relatively poor, especially on the subject of part-time and childcare provisions; whereas energy, catering and education are well above average where work-family provisions in the CLA are concerned. Whether this is indicative of anything is doubtful, however, since most of the above-mentioned branches accommodate relatively few CLAs.

Table 3. Male and female FNV negotiators per branch of industry. N = 322.

Branch of industry	N Female	N Male	N Total	% Female	% Male
Agriculture and fishing	0	7	7	0 %	100 %
Minerals	0	2	2	0 %	100 %
Manufacturing industry	21	65	86	24 %	76 %
Energy	0	4	4	0 %	100 %
Construction	1	9	10	10 %	90 %
Trading	17	23	40	43 %	58 %
Catering	1	2	3	33 %	67 %
Transportation	9	36	45	20 %	80 %
Financial services	4	16	20	20 %	80 %
Business services	20	29	49	41 %	59 %
Public administration	3	3	6	50 %	50 %
Education	0	6	6	0 %	100 %
Health	3	11	14	21 %	79 %
Other services	14	16	30	47 %	53 %
Total	93	229	322		

Source: DUCADAM dataset. N is the number of male and female negotiators per branch of industry. The percentage denotes the share of negotiators of the same sex within a branch. Note that the total numbers of negotiators (93, 229 and 322) in this table are higher than the actual number of negotiating persons; this is due to the fact that over a third of the negotiators are active in more than one branch.

There are 59 female and 158 male negotiators in the sample; they are responsible for 3.7 and 3.5 CLAs on average, respectively. More female negotiators work in the manufacturing industry than in any other branch, which is understandable, because by far most of the collective labour agreements are negotiated in this branch of industry. This is illustrated in table 3. Compared to their male colleagues, they especially tend to work in the business services sector, the trading sector and the 'other services' sector, whereas men are clearly over-represented in agriculture and fishing, minerals, energy, construction, and education¹³.

3.2 THE ROLE OF GENDER IN THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE IN DUTCH CLAS

In this section, the outcomes of the hypotheses are described. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. Values in the table are $\text{Exp}(B)$ values¹⁴, which means that a value of 1 implies no effect between independent and dependent variable, a value smaller than 1 implies a negative effect and a value greater than 1 implies a positive effect.

¹³ It may be interesting to remark that there is hardly any correlation between the share of female employees and the share of female FNV negotiators within branches. The same is true for men.

¹⁴ $\text{Exp}(B)$ means e to the power of B , where e equals 2.71 and B is the coefficient of the independent variable. Suppose B has a value of 1.5. When the independent variable is increased with one unit, the likelihood of the dependent variable occurring (i.e. becoming 1 instead of 0) increases with 1.5. Or, in other words, it becomes e to the power of 1.5 (which equals 4.48) times as likely of the dependent variable occurring.

Table 4. Exp(B) coefficients, predicting the influence of the share of female employees on each of the five work-family balance provisions. N = 769.

	Part-time	Childcare	Paternity leave	Parental leave	Pregnancy and maternity leave
Share of female employees [0 – 100%]	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.00

Source: DUCADAM dataset.

In table 4, all of the coefficients indicate the complete lack of a relationship between the share of female employees per CLA and each one of the work-family balance provisions in the CLA. Although the coefficients in table 5 deviate a bit more from zero, these effects are still not significant, implying that the presence or absence of a specific work-family provision does not depend on the gender of the main FNV negotiator. Both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 must therefore be refuted.

Table 5. Exp(B) coefficients, predicting the influence of the gender of the main trade union negotiator on each of the five work-family balance provisions. N = 769.

	Part-time	Childcare	Paternity leave	Parental leave	Pregnancy and maternity leave
Gender of negotiator [0, 1]	1.05	0.85	0.97	1.00	1.04

Source: DUCADAM dataset. Female = 0, male = 1.

Linear regression analysis on the third hypothesis, linking the share of female employees within a branch of industry to the extent to which CLAs include work-family provisions, shows no significant results either. The standardised beta coefficient is -0.07 . Thus, if there is a relationship, it is not a clear one, and the null-hypothesis cannot yet be rejected. The lack of a clear relationship may be because there is a non-linear relationship. It is imaginable that employers cannot be moved to include work-family provisions in the CLA if the share of women in the company (or sector) is low, since that would mean a large investment that would only benefit a relatively small number of employees. If the share of female employees were high, however, employers might fear it would not be cost effective to provide all employees with work-family arrangements, and therefore they would, again, not include work-family items in the CLA. Only if the share of women were intermediate would employers be indulgent in the collective bargaining rounds in this respect. This implies a parabolic relationship between the share of female employees and the work-family balance score. However, trying to predict the work-family balance score with a squared female employee share yields no significant results (beta equals -0.011). Of course, employers' arguments listed above are purely economic. A 'social' employer would reason quite differently, figuring that if the share of female employees in the company were high, it would be very important to have work-family provisions in the CLA since so many employees would appreciate that; and if it were low, including work-family provisions would be a kind gesture to the few female employees at relatively low costs. From this rationale, it follows that the economic and social arguments produce contrary effects, which means

that effects will probably not be visible at the sector level. A more detailed focus on the employers themselves appears to be needed, including data on personnel and recruiting policies and on how employees are viewed (as assets or as liabilities).

There is an even less clear association between the gender of the FNV trade union negotiator and the work-family balance score. The beta coefficient equals -0.011 , which is not significant. Including both the share of female employees and the negotiator's gender in one model causes both effects to become even smaller, as illustrated in model 1 in table 6.

Table 6. Regression models predicting the work-family balance score [0 – 5] in collective labour agreements. N = 769.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Share of female employees within branch [0 – 100%]	-0.006	0.005	-0.034
Negotiator's gender [0, 1] ^a	-0.007	-0.001	-0.009
Structural wage increase per year [0 – 100%]		0.216 **	0.211 **
CLA size [0 – 320,000 employees]			0.028
Private / public sector [1, 2] ^b			0.035
Sectoral / company CLA [1, 2] ^c			-0.089 *

Standardised coefficients. ** Significant at $\alpha < 0.001$; * Significant at $\alpha < 0.05$.

^a Female = 0, male = 1.

^b Private sector = 1, public sector = 2.

^c Sectoral CLA = 1, company CLA = 2.

To summarise, the share of women and the negotiator's gender play no role in predicting the number of work-family provisions in the CLA, or if they do, the relationships between the variables are quite clouded and unclear.

Surprisingly, there is a positive, significant relationship between the annual wage increase and the work-family balance score (see model 2 in the table). The correlation coefficient is 0.216 and is significant at the 0.001 level. This gives rise to the idea that there might be a dichotomy between two groups of employers: those that provide their employees with both a generous salary increase and a good work-family balance, and those that do not (or less). This effect decreases a little when controlling for sector (private or public) and type of CLA (sectoral or company CLA). As becomes clear from model 3 in table 6, neither sector nor type of CLA proves to have a significant effect on the work-family balance score. Possibly, employers only start thinking about including work-family provisions in their CLA if there is financial room to do so, which is underscored by the wage increases employers are willing to give. This contrasts the idea of including these provisions as a strategic investment move to attract employees and only afterwards (possibly) increase profits.

Apparently, some employers have room financially to provide (future) employees with both an above average wage increase and secondary work-family benefits, possibly because growth and

profit prospects are good, while other employers may find themselves under labour market pressure and cannot be as generous to their employees.

In Model 3, three more control variables are added: CLA size, sector and CLA type. Again, neither the effect of the share of female employees nor that of the gender of the negotiator becomes significant. The effect of the wage increase drops a little but is still significant. No relationship can be found between the number of employees under the CLA and the work-family balance score, and neither is there a clear difference between private and public sector CLAs where the amount of work-family provisions in CLAs is concerned. The type of CLA does seem to matter, however. The empirical data illustrate that the number of work-family provisions in sectoral CLAs is greater than in company CLAs. A possible explanation for this is the following. CLA funds are formal financial reserves of companies and branches of industry, out of which specific expenses are paid. Examples of targets include childcare provisions, and paternity and parental leave provisions. The existence of a CLA fund paves the way for actually spending money on specific CLA provisions, whereas the absence of such a fund might enlarge the threshold to do so. It is more likely for sectoral CLAs than for company CLAs to make use of the concept of CLA funds, as is illustrated by the data: 18.1 per cent of the sectoral CLAs incorporates a CLA fund, whereas only 1.9 per cent of company CLAs uses this kind of funding. This implies a tendency for sectoral CLAs, as opposed to company CLAs, to have more extensive work-family balance provisions.

3.3 LOOKING INTO THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE SCORE

When investigating the relationship between the share of female employees and the work-family balance score, it must be admitted that more detail could have been obtained by examining the five work-family items more closely. Merely analysing the incidence of a childcare provision in a collective labour agreement ignores the fact that some childcare provisions are far more costly to employers than others. For instance, an employer who grants every employee in need of childcare 100 Euros a month to help pay for child day-care expenses is probably worse off financially than an employer who grants only female employees who have been in the company at least one year 50 Euros for childcare expenses, providing the child is under six years of age.

Therefore, it may prove fruitful to rerun the analysis with a more precise dependent variable, to increase both its accuracy and variability. The simple work-family balance score that was used until now only considered whether a work-family sub-item was present in the CLA, neglecting the variety *within* the sub-items. In the DUCADAM dataset, the five work-family sub-items have up to 12 different specification variables, which makes it possible to construct an extended work-family balance score based on 47 different variables, each of which has a specific weight. The details of this construction are described in appendix 3.

The performance of T-tests and Mann-Whitney tests on the group means of all specification variables, with the dichotomous variables share of female employees (high/low), negotiator's gender,

CLA type and sector (public/private) as group identifiers, also gave support for rerunning the analysis with an extended work-family balance score as the dependent variable. It turns out that there are numerous significant differences between the group means, often in favour of one of the two categories. In other words, taking the details of work-family provisions into account, instead of just the presence or absence of these provisions, may provide evidence that the work-family balance score can vary significantly depending on the share of female employees, the gender of the negotiator, the sector or the type of CLA. In appendix 4, the results of the difference tests are tabulated.

The results of this analysis are shown in table 7. In all three models, the betas turn out to be quite similar to those in the previous table.

Table 7. Regression models predicting the extended work-family balance score [0 – 100] in collective labour agreements. N = 769.

	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Share of female employees within branch [0 – 100%]	0.010	– 0.001	– 0.058
Negotiator's gender ^a [0, 1]	– 0.002	0.003	– 0.008
Structural wage increase per year [0 – 100%]		0.185 **	0.179 **
CLA size [0 – 320,000 employees]			0.055
Private / public sector ^b [1, 2]			0.032
Sectoral / company CLA ^c [1, 2]			– 0.150 **

Standardised coefficients. ** Significant at $\alpha < 0.001$.

^a Female = 0, male = 1.

^b Private sector = 1, public sector = 2.

^c Sectoral CLA = 1, company CLA = 2.

The main difference between the simple and the extended work-family balance models is the size of the two significant variables: in the extended version, the weight shifts a little in favour of the type of CLA. Basically, however, running the analysis with a more accurate dependent variable has not yielded any new results, which is underscored by the strength of the correlation between the simple and the extended work-family balance scores ($r = 0.86$).

4 CONCLUSION

No direct relationship exists between the share of female employees that are covered by a collective labour agreement and the extent to which CLAs include work-family provisions. This rate of inclusion cannot be explained by the gender of the negotiator either; whether male or female, a trade union negotiator is a trade union negotiator in this respect.

Apparently, employers do not meet women's demand for work-family balance provisions in collective labour agreements, in the sense that they do not supply (female) employees with an appropriate amount of work-family arrangements. Reasoning from the employee's perspective, one might conclude that the extent to which employers include work-family provisions in their CLA is not a convincingly strong argument for women to consider working for that company or in that sector, or perhaps to contemplate quitting their job.

The absence of a relationship between the share of female employees and work-family provisions in the CLA may also mean something else. Even though the burden of combining work with childcare is taken up primarily by women, a trend towards both women *and* men taking up childcare responsibilities is visible. This implies an increasing interest for employers to target not just women but all employees with respect to work-family provisions, which might explain the aforementioned absence of a clear relationship.

When generalising to the sectoral level, no relationship exists between the type of sector (public or private) and work-family provisions in the CLA, neither at the level of individual provisions, nor at an aggregated and more detailed level, symbolised by the (extended) work-family balance score. The type of collective agreement, however, does matter. Employees who are covered by a sectoral CLA tend to have more extensive work-family provisions than employees covered by a company CLA, possibly because the concept of CLA funds is more common in sectoral CLAs.

Demand does not play a role in the work-family benefits pattern in CLAs, but other reasons might exist. The relationship of an annual wage increase with the level of work-family provisions in CLAs may imply a caring—uncaring typology of companies, although stating this is simplifying matters vastly and demands new research.

New lines of investigation may be conducted in the following direction. It can be hypothesised that companies, in their strive to attract and retain employees, show trend-following behaviour with regard to other companies in the same branch of industry. If a competitor of company X introduces certain appealing terms and conditions in their CLA, company X may well fear losing valuable (future) employees to this competitor. This could be a reason to include the same terms in company X's own CLA. However, if one assumes only company size to be an indicator for the possibility of being a trendsetter, then this hypothesis must be refuted (see tables 5 and 6, CLA size). Another interesting line of reasoning, related to the central question in this paper, is the following. It can be argued that companies that include one type of work-family balance provision in their CLA do this

at the cost of another type. In other words, the work-family provisions are traded off against one another. This is based on the idea that companies try to keep employees satisfied at the lowest possible cost. The opposite of this idea is a clustering of work-family balance provisions: if one type is included in the CLA, it is likely that another type is as well. The idea behind this is that companies have ideologies with respect to their employees – either they care about their work-family balance, or they do not (but may have other priorities).

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APPENDIX I: DICTIONARY

In this list, words and abbreviations that may have unclear or ambiguous meanings are explained.

Branch of industry	The collection of companies with a similar core business. The CBS* distinguishes 58 different branches.
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics, situated in Voorburg and in Heerlen, the Netherlands.
CLA	Collective Labour Agreement: a written agreement between employer and employees about terms and conditions.
Company CLA	A CLA* by which one company (and thus all employees within the company) is covered.
FNV	Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging, Federation of the Dutch Trade Unions: The largest trade union federation in the Netherlands.
Gender	Being either male or female.
Labour force	All (Dutch) employees and entrepreneurs who are actively working for at least twelve hours a week.
Labour Inspectorate	Part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, responsible for enforcing labour protection laws and investigating labour-related complaints and accidents.
Negotiator	Someone responsible for establishing a collective labour agreement by means of collective bargaining.
Sector, also Sector type	Either the public or the private sector.
Sectoral CLA	A CLA* by which all companies (and thus all employees) with a similar core business are covered.
Work-family balance provision, also Work-family provision	Arrangements or conditions in a CLA* that make it easier for employees to combine work and family responsibilities.

APPENDIX 2: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES

In order for control variables to be safely used, the correlation between them should not exceed about 0.50. In the table below, correlation coefficients are given for all independent and all control variables. The largest is 0.37, which is still below 0.50.

Table A2.1 Correlation between independent and control variables

	Share of female employees within branch	Negotiator's gender	Structural wage increase per year	CLA size	Private / public sector	Sectoral / company CLA
Share of female employees within branch	1					
Negotiator's gender ^a	-0.10	1				
Structural wage increase per year	-0.05	-0.03	1			
CLA size	0.12	0.07	-0.04	1		
Private / public sector ^b	0.37	0.07	-0.04	0.11	1	
Sectoral / company CLA ^c	-0.26	-0.01	-0.02	-0.27	-0.16	1

^a Female = 0, male = 1.

^b Private sector = 1, public sector = 2.

^c Sectoral CLA = 1, company CLA = 2.

APPENDIX 3: CALCULATION OF THE EXTENDED WORK-FAMILY BALANCE SCORE

The extended work-family balance score has a range of 0 to 100, where 100 stands for the best possible work-family provisions for the employee. Scores are attributed to sub-items according to their importance. In other words: how well do they assist female employees in combining work with family life?

Since part-time and childcare provisions are structural rather than temporary, they can be given a maximum of 30 points, whereas parental leave and pregnancy/maternity leave arrangements receive up to 15 points. Paternity leave arrangements are the least demanding provisions financially – from the employer’s point of view – so this sub-item can maximally receive 10 points.

In the tables below, an account is given of how the points are obtained. For each of the five work-family sub-items applies that if there is no provision, no computation is necessary: the sub-item receives zero points. If a specific work-family provision does exist in the CLA, the final score for this sub-item can be computed according to the values in the table. For example, if there is no childcare provision in the CLA, the childcare variable as a whole receives zero points; if there is such a provision, the number of points depends on the exact contents of the provision. Some aspects of the childcare provision are more important than others, and will therefore potentially receive more points.

Table AI.1 Distribution of points for the part-time provision sub-item.

Do employees have the right to work part-time?			
No	→ End-score for sub-item 'Part-time provisions' equals zero.		0
Yes	→ Is this true for all employees?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 5
→	Must part-time employees work a minimum number of hours a week?		
	No		+ 3
	Yes	→ Is the minimum greater than 24?	
	No		+ 1.5
	Yes		+ 0
→	Company policy to increase the number or percentage of part-time jobs:		
	Number = 0		+ 0
	Number > 0		+ 1
	Percentage = 0		+ 0
	Percentage > 0		+ 1
→	Must part-time employees work a minimum number of hours a week to retain the right to schooling, training, early retirement, et cetera?		
	No		+ 2
	Yes		+ 0
→	Do part-timers have the same rights as full-timers?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 5
→	Do part-timers receive the same overtime bonus as full-timers?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 3
→	Do part-timers have a voice in their working schedule?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 5
→	Do part-timers have the opportunity to save up for a leave of absence?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 2
→	Can part-timers increase their number of working hours?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 3

Table AI.2 Distribution of points for the childcare provision sub-item.

Can employees make use of childcare provisions?			
No	→ End-score for sub-item 'Childcare provisions' equals zero.		0
Yes	→ Is this true for all employees?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 5
→	Only women can make use of childcare provisions.		
	No		+ 1
	Yes		+ 0
→	Maximum number of children per employee.		
	≤ 1 child		+ 1
	> 1 child		+ 3
→	Maximum amount of money available for childcare.		
	≤ € 5000		+ 1
	> € 5000		+ 3
→	Maximum age of children for whom childcare is available.		
	≤ 4 years		+ 1
	> 4 years		+ 3
→	Is childcare being paid from a CLA fund?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 6
→	Is the employer's financial contribution for childcare maximised?		
	No		+ 4
	Yes	→ How large is this maximum contribution?	
	≤ € 2500		+ 0
	> € 2500		+ 2
→	Are childcare arrangements set up according to the VWS table?		
	No		+ 0
	Yes		+ 5

Table A1.3 Distribution of points for the paternity leave provision sub-item.

Can employees make use of paternity leave provisions?				
No	End-score for sub-item 'Paternity leave provisions' equals zero.		0	
Yes	→	Is this provision set up according to the Work & Care Act?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 1
	→	Number of days paternity leave.	≤ 2	+ 0
			> 2	+ 3
	→	Number of hours paternity leave.	0	+ 0
			> 0	+ 1
	→	Continued pay during leave?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 1
	→	Continued pay during leave.	≤ 50%	+ 0
			>50%	+ 2
	→	Is paternity leave being paid from a CLA fund?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 2

Table A1.4 Distribution of points for the parental leave provision sub-item.

More days of parental leave than prescribed by law?				
No	End-score for sub-item 'Parental leave provisions' equals zero.		0	
Yes	→	Length of extra parental leave.	≤ 1 week	+ 1
			> 1 week	+ 2
	→	Continued pay during parental leave?	No	+ 0
			Yes → Continued pay during parental leave.	≤ 50% + 2 > 50% + 3
	→	Obligation to continue working during parental leave?	No	+ 2
			Yes → Obligation to continue working during parental leave.	≤ 20 hrs + 1 > 20 hrs + 0
	→	Is pension premium (employer) paid during parental leave?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 1
	→	Is pension premium (employee) paid during parental leave?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 1
	→	Is pension premium (fund) paid during parental leave?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 1
	→	Is parental leave being paid from a CLA fund?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 2
	→	Parental leave: maximum allowed age of child.	≤ 4 years	+ 0
			> 4 years	+ 1
	→	Maximum allowed age of child in case of paid parental leave.	≤ 4 years	+ 0
			> 4 years	+ 1
	→	Is partitioning of parental leave possible?	No	+ 0
			Yes	+ 1

Table A1.5 Distribution of points for the pregnancy / maternity leave provision sub-item.

More days of pregnancy / maternity leave than prescribed by law?			
No	End-score for sub-item 'pregnancy / maternity leave provisions' equals zero.	0	
Yes →	Length of extra pregnancy / maternity leave.	< 1 week	+ 4
		> 1 week	+ 8
→	Does the employee have the right to refuse certain tasks?	No	+ 0
		Yes	+ 2
→	Can the employee make use of breast-feeding facilities?	No	+ 0
		Yes	+ 2
→	Can the pregnant employee be excluded from work?	No	+ 3
		Yes	+ 0

APPENDIX 4: DIFFERENCE TESTS ON THE MEANS OF WORK-FAMILY VARIABLES

In the table below, the means of all work-family balance variables are displayed per group, where groups are defined based on the share of female employees who are covered by a CLA, the negotiator's gender, public or private sector, and type of CLA. A number in bold formatting indicates a significant difference; of the two values in that cell, the one in bold is the mean for the group in which the respective variable has the best work-family balance score. For instance, in the top left cell the mean values 0.62 and 0.51 are displayed. The CLAs in the sample are divided into two groups: those in which the share of female employees they cover is smaller than or equal to 41.8 per cent, and those in which it is greater¹⁵. In sixty-two per cent of the first group of CLAs, employees have the right to work part-time. This is significantly more than the fifty-one per cent of the second group. This is an indication of a negative relationship between the share of female employees and the extent to which CLAs include work-family provisions.

Table A2.1 T-tests and Mann-Whitney tests on the means of all work-family balance variables.

Work-family balance variables	Test	Female share		Gender		Sector		CLA type	
		0	1	0	1	1	2	1	2
Do employees have the right to work part-time?	MW	0.62	0.51	0.58	0.59	0.59	0.51	0.70	0.64
Is this true for all employees?	MW	0.31	0.36	0.27	0.34	0.31	0.49	0.41	0.33
Must part-time employees work a minimum number of hours a week?	MW	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.13	0.11
If so, is the minimum greater than 24?	T	4.34	3.15	11.50	1.07	4.25	0.47	1.16	2.35
Company policy to increase the number of part-time jobs.	T	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Company policy to increase the percentage of part-time jobs.	T	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Must part-time employees work a minimum number of hours a week to retain the right to schooling, training, early retirement, et cetera?	T	0.07	0.28	0.25	0.11	0.16	0.00	0.11	0.15
Do part-timers have the same rights as full-timers?	MW	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.37	0.24
Do part-timers receive the same overtime bonus as full-timers?	MW	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.13
Do part-timers have a voice in their working schedule?	MW	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.08
Do part-timers have the opportunity to save up for a leave of absence?	MW	0.07	0.10	0.05	0.09	0.08	0.14	0.10	0.09
Can part-timers increase their number of working hours?	MW	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.12	0.13
Can employees make use of childcare provisions?	MW	0.61	0.62	0.63	0.59	0.60	0.61	0.73	0.67
Is this true for all employees?	MW	0.35	0.30	0.38	0.31	0.33	0.29	0.43	0.37
Only women can make use of childcare provisions.	MW	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.04
Maximum number of children per employee.	T	1.40	5.32	0.78	2.91	2.50	0.00	4.85	1.70
Maximum amount of money available for childcare.	T	5869	3391	6265	4727	5507	271	1851	7501
Maximum age of children for whom childcare is available.	T	2.36	2.40	2.44	2.30	2.38	1.82	3.04	2.47

¹⁵ 41.8% is the average female employment rate in the Netherlands; in other words, of all employees, 41.8% is female.

Work-family balance variables	Test	Female share		Gender		Sector		CLA type	
		0	1	0	1	1	2	1	2
Is childcare being paid from a CLA fund?	MW	0.04	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.12	0.20	0.02
Is the employer's financial contribution for childcare maximised?	MW	0.17	0.18	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.10	0.25	0.18
How large is this maximum contribution?	T	1374	5430	3756	1786	2508	0	4245	2388
Are childcare arrangements set up according to the VWS table?	MW	0.11	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.19	0.10
Can employees make use of paternity leave provisions?	MW	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.23
Is this provision set up according to the Work & Care Act?	MW	0.21	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.08	0.24	0.23
Number of days of paternity leave.	T	0.50	0.65	0.59	0.51	0.51	0.78	0.66	0.57
Number of hours of paternity leave.	T	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.56	0.00	0.00
Continued pay during leave?	MW	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.20	0.16	0.22	0.22
Continued pay during leave.	T	16.86	17.93	18.70	16.77	16.73	15.69	20.83	18.41
Is paternity leave being paid from a CLA fund?	MW	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00
More days of parental leave than prescribed by law?	MW	0.10	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.25	0.12	0.12
Length of extra parental leave.	T	0.39	0.65	0.38	0.47	0.42	0.82	0.32	0.54
Continued pay during parental leave?	MW	0.04	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.22	0.11	0.03
If so, level of pay during parental leave.	T	1.21	2.18	1.02	1.71	0.98	9.02	2.93	0.67
Obligation to continue working during parental leave?	MW	0.08	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.09	0.10
If so, number of hours obliged to continue working during parental leave.	T	0.63	0.45	0.68	0.57	0.63	0.16	0.73	0.73
Is pension premium (employer) paid during parental leave?	MW	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.07
Is pension premium (employee) paid during parental leave?	MW	0.37	0.22	0.31	0.33	0.32	0.35	0.31	0.41
Is pension premium (fund) paid during parental leave?	MW	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.01
Is parental leave being paid from a CLA fund?	MW	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Parental leave: maximum allowed age of child.	T	7.14	8.03	7.77	7.36	7.43	7.75	7.82	7.35
Maximum allowed age of child in case of paid parental leave.	T	0.01	0.13	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.31	0.03	0.04
Is partitioning of parental leave possible?	MW	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
More days of pregnancy / maternity leave than prescribed by law?	MW	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.10	0.09
Length of extra pregnancy / maternity leave.	T	1.07	1.11	1.00	1.08	0.96	2.43	1.31	1.19
Does the employee have the right to refuse certain tasks?	MW	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01
Can the employee make use of breast-feeding facilities?	MW	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.02
Can the pregnant employee be excluded from work?	MW	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01

Source: DUCADAM dataset.

Test	T = Student's T-test, MW = Mann-Whitney (non-parametrical) test
Female share	0 = less than or equal to 41.8%, 1 = more than 41.8%
Gender	0 = female negotiator, 1 = male negotiator
Sector	1 = private sector, 2 = public sector
CLA type	1 = sectoral CLA, 2 = company CLA

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